Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
Today, the United States is involved in multiple conflicts throughout the world. Our involvement is at least partially a result of a National Security Strategy (NSS) which places military forces at the forefront of foreign policy. Military doctrine and concepts focus on battlefield operations, not on the historically more difficult war termination -and not on ultimate triumph. Like war itself, war termination is both political and military, structured and unstructured, art and science. To realize national strategic objectives and develop a triumphant peace, operational commanders must shun the current vision of the U.S. Armed Forces, look critically at conflict termination theories, and expand the boundaries of operational art and doctrine.
The challenge facing operational commanders after ending a regime and in the midst of nationbuilding is substantial. Although doctrine sees leverage as a critical ingredient in warfare, leverage is also a key element in reaching an acceptable war termination. Leverage may take conventional and unconventional forms. There is an appropriate saying about the military, "when you see yourself as a hammer, every problem is a nail." To meet the current strategic security needs as outlined in the current NSS, the military establishment must grow from a single tool to become a tool box.
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INTRODUCTION
After the surrender of Germany and Japan in World War II, the United States ventured into the role of the defender of liberty, peace and human dignity throughout the world. This role led to many subsequent conflicts, usually in cooperation with other partners and agencies in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Although the goal of each action was noble, the outcomes were void of the same splendid aura. Why?
The success or failure of foreign intervention is governed by the outcome achieved.
The end determines triumph. The U.S. political/civilian leadership directs policy, national strategy and, when required, subsequent military action. At this point, the military becomes responsible, with the support of other elements of national power, for the achievement of policy objectives. Historically, the military has proven itself competent in attaining battlefield victory; however, all too often, an enduring peace after conflict termination seems illusive. Military doctrine and concepts are focused on battlefield operations, not on the historically more difficult condition -war termination and the ultimate triumph. To realize national strategic objectives and develop a triumphant peace, operational commanders must shun the current vision of the U.S. Armed Forces, look critically at conflict termination theories, and expand the boundaries of operational art and doctrine. This paper was written after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and during the effort by the United States and its coalition partners to bring a peaceful end to the Iraqi War.
It discusses issues directly related to this ongoing effort without directly mentioning aspects of the campaign. Much of the material concerning Operation Iraqi Freedom is either classified beyond the security level of this paper or too contradictory in the realm of political, military, and public offerings to support an academic document. Furthermore, this paper is focused on the military and what actions operational commanders and strategists might consider when seeking war termination. Most theorists and strategists agree that war is conducted by both the political and military establishment; however, although the U.S.
Armed Forces task themselves with fighting and winning our Nation's wars 3 , America's diplomats do not. To win, the military must claim significant responsibility to successfully end wars. The following discussion reviews current U.S. Government military guidance and future direction, analyzes doctrine and theories of war termination and proposes recommendations for operational commanders.
FUTURE TRENDS AND CURRENT DIRECTION
Today, the United States is involved in multiple conflicts throughout the world. Our involvement is in large part the result of a National Security Strategy (NSS) which places military forces at the forefront of foreign policy. Current conflicts take on the aura of past wars while reflecting trends in globalization, regionalization, and post-Cold War realities.
War is now the genre of both state and non-state cliques representing a myriad of political, ethnic and even religious groups. Each of these groups is a capable belligerent and many will choose violence if not outright warfare to achieve their objectives. Cold War competition spread the means to create war to state and non-state actors throughout the world. These means fuel armed conflict which may or may not be centrally controlled. As a result, disassociated groups and individuals possess weapons which fuel violence, terrorism, and insurgency.
According to Professor Thomas Barnett, the world is divided into the Core and the Gap. 4 In support of national interests, the United States, as a member of the Core, has the obligation to shrink the Gap through the export of security and other exports, like economic aid and democracy. The Gap's critical characteristic is "disconnectedness." The state and non-state actors within the Gap define the threat and create the dilemma for traditional conflict and, ultimately, termination. The state and non-state actors within the Gap are not connected to the traditional ways of war and conflict. Therefore, our ability to apply traditional war termination theory and concepts are now even more challenged. The United
States must take the offensive to win our current wars and shrink the Gap. 5 Because shrinking the Gap may involve war which is still "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will," 6 military force will be used. hampers the understanding of war termination. The result is that the doctrine lacks unity. Classic theories of war termination mirrored the rational models of war. The political leadership identified the national interests and objectives, determined the threat and devised a national and military strategy to achieve the objectives. Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and
Machiavelli were examples of classic theorists of war. Decisions relating to the conduct and end of the war were weighed against the objectives and the costs of the war. The calculation considered the opponent's position and objectives. Most conceded that war was never finished or that ending is difficult. These theorists assumed "that war termination is a discrete post-war process which falls in the political leaders' bailiwick." 16 Rarely were the decision-makers able to acquire the information and knowledge necessary to determine a logical or cost/benefit approach to termination. Likewise, this approach was difficult when considering that war is a clash of wills in which each participant's motivation and influences were indeterminate.
During the 1970s, theorists, influenced by the ongoing Vietnam War, still viewed termination through rational models. Although the Korean War had eventually ended with a return to status quo, terminating operations in Vietnam seemed impossible. The opponent acted irrationally compared to previous wars. Nuclear power and overwhelming conventional forces were unable to bring an end. Theorists considered the historical success of escalation, concession, deterrence, and appeasement in finding a solution to termination.
However, government leaders were hampered because "they often implicitly assume answers to questions that they never examined." 17 Military and political decision-makers were required to make estimates about the course of war based on mountains of data about friendly and enemy armies. This data rarely provided a view of the qualitative aspect of war, the will of the opponent, or the impact of other non-military factors or actors.
In the 1980s, again as a result of the failed effort in Vietnam, theorists attempted new models which examined the relationship between national and military strategy. These theories compared the complex political environment with the structured world of the military and offered recommendations. Solutions evolved around educating policy makers about the capabilities and limitations of the military. Clear, achievable military objectives became the goal from which termination was discerned through civilian involvement in military planning. These theories led to tenets and doctrines for using military force. The
Weinberger "Doctrine" was one result and stated that the military must only be committed when vital interests are at stake, with a requirement to win, with clear objectives, adjusted as necessary, supported by the American people, and as a last resort. These tenets would prevent, theoretically, the failure of Vietnam. The goal of these efforts only diffused the problem by pushing the issue of termination to political leaders. Because of the nature of war today, these theories and subsequent tenets have minimal value.
In the 1990s, the theorists continued with new models for war termination which consider the non-rational factors involved. These theorists began to deal with the realities of war which were shrouded in the proverbial fog. One model was proposed by Bruce Clarke.
His models led to a conflict organization with six phases: dispute, pre-hostility, hostility, post-hostility, second dispute, and settlement. 18 The genesis of termination flowed from the political haggling during both dispute phases to reach ultimate victory. Hostilities might continue as the conflict flowed between war and peace. These new theories were helpful and began to bridge the theory-strategy gap. However, detailed and extravagant campaign plans were still needed to address the uncertainties of war and the possible insurmountable factors in war termination.
Reviewing theories improves the operational commander's understanding without providing proven solutions. Moreover, history is replete with war termination failures and each situation is unique. In combination, however, theories and models offer insight into the complex factors and past failures governing war termination. Because post-conflict environments are extremely untidy and unpredictable, intuitive skills are possibly more valuable to an operational commander than the deliberate decision-making normally associated with war planning. There is an appropriate saying about the military, "when you see yourself as a hammer, every problem is a nail." To meet current strategic security needs as outlined in the NSS, the military establishment must grow from a single tool and become a tool box. The approach to contemporary warfare is similar to the approach taken to remodel an old house.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER
A general contractor develops an intricate plan which integrates the efforts of scores of diverse craftsmen and laborers to accomplish the vision of a new, improved house. Like the contractor, the operational commander must orchestrate the varied limited resources, equipment, and time to accomplish the ultimate task. In the end, the mission is not deemed complete only when the last task is done and accepted. Military force is one "tool box" available to the modern operational commander. The plan for war must be just as intricate as The second recommendation considers the use of operational art in war termination.
Operational art, by definition, applies to the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. States, through the NSS, states that "we will be prepared to act apart" 25 with the military and nation potentially alone on the battlefield. This difficult prospect might manifest itself in eliminating regimes and building nations -each requiring massive efforts over long periods.
Because this type of war, and eventual desire for war termination, encompasses both political 
